GERMANY AFTER 1945 Germany
after 1945 part 2
The founding of the Federal Republic of Germany This concept was supplemented by the rule-of-law and the welfare-state principle embodied in the Basic Law and by the country's federal structure. The constitution was deliberately termed the 'Basic Law' in order to emphasize its provisional character. The idea was that a definitive constitution should only be adopted after Germany's reunification. The Basic Law naturally included many of the intentions of the western occupying powers, who, with the Frankfurt Documents presented on 1 July 1948, authorized West Germany's minister presidents (i.e. the heads of government of the Lander) to draw up a constitution. But that document also reflects much of Germany's experience with the Weimar Republic and the 'legal' installation of the nazi dictatorship. The constitutional convention held at Herrenchiemsee (10-23 August 1948) and the Parliamentary Council which met in Bonn on 1 September 1948 (65 delegates of the state parliaments) incorporated in the Basic Law (adopted on 8 May 1949) provisions requiring future governments, parties and other political groupings to protect the democratic system. Ever since, all attempts to do away with the liberal, democratic system, or to replace it with a right-wing or leftwing dictatorship, have been treated as criminal offences and the organizations concerned can be banned. The Federal Constitutional Court, the guardian of the constitution, is the authority which decides whether a party is legal or not. Whereas the authors of the Weimar constitution, naively believing in the uprightness of parliament, had, through article 76, made it possible for enemies of the constitution to destroy what in those days was the most liberal constitution in the world, article 79 of the Basic Law prohibits any change in its article 1 (which ties the use of all public authority to protection of human rights), and any attempt to do away with the country's democratic, social and federal system (article 20 (4)). These requirements were an immediate reaction to what had happened under the nazi dictatorship, at whose hands most of the 'politicians of the Federal Republic's first hour' had suffered, those men and women who were now rebuilding Germany on the democratic traditions of 1848 and 1919 and in the spirit of the 'revolt of the conscience' of 20 July 1944. All of them personified in the eyes of the world the 'other Germany' and won the respect of the occupying powers. They included the first Federal President Theodor Heuss (FDP), the first Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (CDU), and Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard (CDU), the 'locomotive' of the 'economic miracle', but also the outstanding leaders of the SPD opposition such as Kurt Schumacher and Erich Ollenhauer, as well as the cosmopolitan Carlo Schmid. It was they who gave the new party system in West Germany its unmistakable character. Gradually, Germany's involvement and political influence increased (Occupation Statute, Petersberg Agreements, membership of GATT, accession to the European Coal and Steel Community). In July 1951 the United Kingdom, France and the United States declared that Germany was no longer a war enemy. The Soviet Union did the same on 25 January 1955. Security through integration with the west and European reconciliation. To Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who until 1963 had largely held the reigns of foreign and domestic policy himself (Chancellor democracy), Germany's reunification in peace and freedom was the foremost political objective. To achieve this it was necessary for West Germany to be integrated into the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly, the restoration of the Federal Republic's sovereignty on 5 May 1955 coincided with its accession to NATO. This alliance was to be the main protective shield, the proposed European Defence Community having proved abortive due to French resistance. At the same time the European Communities (Treaty of Rome, 1957) were developed into an anti-communist bastion. Adenauer's distrust of Moscow was so deeprooted that in 1952 he, together with the other western powers, rejected Stalin's offer of reuniting Germany as a neutral country as far as the Oder-Neisse line. To the Chancellor the protection of American troops in Germany was indispensable. His suspicion seemed only too justified when, on 17 June 1953, the people's uprising in East Germany in protest against their life of bondage and against the unbearable productivity norms imposed by the regime, was savagely put down by Soviet tanks. This showed once again that without Moscow little progress could be made on the German question. Thus for sober political reasons it was expedient to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union as the largest power in Europe. This was accomplished during Adenauer's visit to Moscow in September 1955, on which occasion he also secured the release of the last 10,000 German prisoners-of-war and about 20,000 civilians. The crushing of the popular revolt in Hungary by Soviet troops in November 1956, as well as the 'Sputnik shock' (4 October 1957), signalled a considerable growth of Soviet power, which manifested itself in the establishment of a socialist system in East Germany, but above all in the Berlin ultimatum issued by Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, who demanded that the western allies leave West Berlin within six months. Their adamant refusal caused Khrushchev to try a softer approach on Berlin. His visit to the United States in 1959 did indeed considerably improve the atmosphere (spirit of Camp David), and the American President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, to the great concern of the Bonn government, felt that the Russian transgressions of international agreements regarding Berlin were not so serious as to warrant a military conflict outside Germany. Bonn's disquiet with regard to Berlin's security increased when John F. Kennedy became President of the United States. This represented a change of generation in the American leadership which considerably reduced Adenauer's influence on US policy towards Europe. True, Kennedy guaranteed with his three 'essentials' (25 July 1961) free access to Berlin, the presence of the western powers in the city, and its overall security, but when the Berlin wall was built on 13 August 1961 the allied reaction went little beyond diplomatic protests and symbolic threats. Once again Moscow was able to safeguard its protectorate. Barricades, death strips and repression prevented the people from 'voting with their feet' against the East German regime. In July alone, the month before the wall was erected, over 30,000 people had fled from East Germany. The wall had staked out the claims of the superpowers. Although the German question had not been resolved it at least seemed regulated. Even after the Cuba crisis in 1962 the two superpowers continued to seek a better understanding they had to on account of the nuclear stalemate. Bonn therefore had no option but to look in other directions, and the temporary estrangement with Washington was in fact outwardly compensated for by the 'summer of French friendship'. With the Treaty which they signed in January 1963 Chancellor Adenauer and President de Gaulle laid special emphasis on Franco-German friendship. In order to stress the new quality of this relationship de Gaulle, during his triumphant state visit to Bonn a few months previously, had spoken of the 'great German nation'. In his view the Second World War had to be seen more in terms of tragedy than of guilt. As the Federal Republic became increasingly integrated into the western community the atmosphere also began to improve in the relationship with eastern Europe. In December 1963 NATO, at a ministerial meeting in Athens, had signalled this change with its new strategy of flexible response in place of that of massive retaliation. In an attempt to soften the rigid East-West relationship, the Federal Republic tried to improve contacts at least with the Soviet Union's satellite countries. Without officially abandoning the Hallstein Doctrine, that is to say Bonn's policy of severing relations with any country which recognized the GDR, Adenauer's successors, Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Georg Kiesinger, based their policy on the harsh realities prevailing in central Europe. They were prompted to do so not least by the new approach adopted by the SPD opposition, which promoted Egon Bahr's formula of 'change through rapprochement' (15 July 1963). The establishment of German trade missions in Bucharest and Budapest was a promising start. In the west increasing efforts were being made to merge the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community, into one European Community (8 April 1965). The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel despite pan-Arab protests was a major step in the Federal Republic's policy of rapprochement. At the beginning of 1967 Bonn established diplomatic relations with Romania, and in June the Federal Republic and Czechoslovakia opened trade missions in their respective capitals. The Harmel Report of December 1967 at least prepared the way for further steps towards detente by laying down the western alliance's twofold aim of maintaining its military strength whilst at the same time being ready to talk to the eastern bloc. In that year Bonn and Belgrade resumed diplomatic relations, they having been broken off by the Federal Republic on account of Yugoslavia's recognition of the GDR. And from Poland came proposals for a non-aggression pact. In addition to the policy of reconciliation with Germany's European neighbours and her integration into the western community, Adenauer too had attached special importance to restitution for the Jews. Six million Jews had been systematically exterminated by the nazis. It was not least the close personal relationship between the Federal Republic's first Chancellor and Israel's Prime Minister Ben Gurion which fostered the process of reconciliation between Jews and Germans. One outstanding event at that time was their meeting in New York's Waldorf Astoria Hotel on 14 March 1960. Addressing parliament in 1961, Adenauer stressed that the Federal Republic could only prove that the Germans had broken completely with their nazi past by making material restitution as well. As early as 1952 the first agreement had been signed in Luxembourg. It provided for assistance for the integration of Jewish refugees in Israel. Of the total sum of about 90 billion marks provided for restitution purposes, roughly one third went to Israel and Jewish organizations, and especially to the Jewish Claims Conference, a hardship fund which helped Jews all over the world who had been persecuted by the nazis. However, diplomatic relations between the two countries were not established until 1965. German-German dialogue in spite of the GDR's self-detachment. In spite of the GDR's continuing efforts to cut itself off completely from the west (e.g. by requiring passports and visas for persons in transit between the Federal Republic and West Berlin) and in spite of the Warsaw Pact's crushing of attempted reforms in Czechoslovakia, the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' of the indivisibility of the socialist bloc did not have any serious repercussions on the process of detente. In April 1969 Bonn said it was ready to enter into agreements with the GDR below the level of international recognition. Obviously, German-German agreements of this kind could hardly be achieved without some kind of prior understanding with Moscow. When the Soviet Union proposed a non-aggression pact, the 'new eastern policy'adopted by the Social-Liberal coalition that had assumed power in Bonn on 21 October 1969 quickly began to take on substance. A few months previously (5 March 1969) Gustav Heinemann, who even in Adenauer's day had been a strong advocate of East-West rapprochement, had been elected Federal President. Willy Brandt, who had played an active part in the resistance against the Hitler dictatorship, was now head of a federal government which directed its energies to the construction of a peaceful order throughout Europe. The international constellation was favourable. Moscow and Washington were negotiating on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT), and NATO proposed negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR). On 28 November 1969 the Federal Republic became a party to the treaty banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT). Following the turbulence experienced by its predecessor, the grand coalition government (Viet Nam conflict, emergency legislation, Auschwitz trials, Extra-Parliamentary Opposition, and student revolts), the new cabinet, by embarking on its 'Ostpolitik', placed itself under considerable pressure to produce results. While talks on a non-aggression agreement were being conducted in Moscow and Warsaw, Bonn and East Berlin, too, explored the possibilities of improving relations. On 19 March 1970 the heads of government of both German states, Willy Brandt and Willi Stoph, met for the first time in Erfurt. This was followed by another meeting on 21 May in Kassel. On 12 August 1970 a treaty on the renunciation of force and recognition of the status quo was signed in Moscow. Both sides proclaimed that they had no territorial claims against anyone. In a 'letter on German unity' presented to the Soviet Government in Moscow, the Federal Republic stated that the treaty did not contradict its aim of working towards a state of peace in Europe 'in which the German people will regain their unity in free self-determination'. On 7 December of that year the Treaty of Warsaw was signed which reaffirmed the inviolability of the existing border (the Oder-Neisse line). Warsaw and Bonn, too, gave an assurance that they had no territorial claims against one another and declared their intention of improving mutual cooperation. In an 'information' document on humanitarian measures, Warsaw agreed to the transfer of ethnic Germans from Poland and the reunion of separated families by the Red Cross. In order to pave the way for the ratification of those treaties, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on Berlin which stated that Berlin was not a constituent part of the Federal Republic but that Bonn was entitled to represent West Berlin. In addition, the 'ties' between West Berlin and the Federal Republic were to be improved and relations between East Berlin/GDR and West Berlin developed (signing of the Transit Agreement on 17 December). Germany's efforts to foster peace and detente received worldwide recognition which culminated in the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Willy Brandt (1971). However, the CDU/CSU, who were in opposition for the first time, considered the results of the negotiations too meagre. Yet their constructive vote of no confidence against Brandt came to grief (247 for, 249 against) and the Bundestag (parliament) ratified the treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland on 17 May. Most CDU/CSU members of parliament abstained. The Bundestag, in an 'interpretative resolution', declared that the treaties did not conflict with the aim of restoring German unity by peaceful means. The series of treaties with Eastern Europe was rounded off by a Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the two Germanies which had been preceded by talks and negotiations since June 1972. After Willy Brandt's reelection as Chancellor on 14 December, the way was clear for the signing of the treaty on 21 December. Both sides undertook not to threaten or use force against one another and to respect each other's independence. The inviolability of the border between the two states was also endorsed. Furthermore, the two sides expressed their willingness to resolve humanitarian problems in a practical manner. It was agreed that, owing to the special nature of their relationship, they would establish 'representations' in their respective capitals instead of the usual embassies. At the signing ceremony the Federal Government again handed over a letter emphasizing its intention to pursue German unity. The government of the state of Bavaria asked the Federal Constitutional Court to confirm that the treaty did not run contrary to this objective. It also noted that the German Empire continued to exist in international law and was partially identical with the Federal Republic. The Court ruled that the GDR could not be regarded as a foreign country, only as domestic territory. In 1973 the Treaty of Prague between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic was signed. It declared the Munich Agreement of 1938 to be null and void 'in accordance with this Treaty'. The two sides also agreed that their borders were inviolable and that they would not use force against one another. Whilst negotiations were going on in Vienna on mutual balanced force reductions, the Soviet Union and the United States completed an agreement designed to prevent a nuclear war, and 35 countries attended a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, little change came about in the relationship between the GDR and the Federal Republic. On the one hand, East Berlin benefited both materially and financially from the follow-up agreements to the Basic Treaty, but on the other the East German regime meticulously kept its ideological distance. The East German constitution was amended and the term 'socialist state of the German nation' was replaced by 'socialist state of workers and peasants'. Also omitted was the passage '... fulfilling its responsibility to show the entire German nation the way into a future of peace and socialism'. Nonetheless, Helmut Schmidt, too, strived to continue the policy of developing a balanced relationship. On 16 May 1974 he had succeeded Willy Brandt, who had resigned from the chancellorship when one of his aides, Gunther Guillaume, was unmasked as an East German spy. The 'swing' arrangement, a facility which allowed the GDR to overdraw by as much as DM 850 million on its credit from the Federal Republic, was extended until 1981. The GDR continued to profit handsomely from the various transit agreements which were financed by the West, without budging on the political issues. The Final Act of Helsinki (1975), which called for greater freedom of movement in transboundary traffic and more respect for human and civil rights, proved to be a disappointment, not only to the East Germans but to the people of other East European countries as well. There was no end to the chicanery at East Germany's borders. People were arbitrarily turned back, as were visitors to the Leipzig Fair. Western journalists who criticized the GDR were forced to leave the country. The East German regime suffered a further loss of prestige around the world when it deprived Wolf Biermann, a well-known singer-songwriter, of his citizenship. In spite of all this, the Federal Republic decided for the sake of the people in East Germany to continue its efforts to improve relations. Thus in 1978 an agreement was reached to build an autobahn from Berlin to Hamburg and to repair the transit waterways to West Berlin, the greater proportion of the cost being borne by the Federal Republic. The Federal Government also continued to buy the release of political prisoners from the GDR. In the end Bonn had paid over DM 3.5 billion for the release of 33,755 people, and to have 250,000 families reunited. Missiles versus detente Whereas the process of European integration continued steadily in the West, the transition from the 70s, the decade of detente, to the 80s was marked by fresh conflicts in Eastern Europe. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland, as well as the emplacement of new intermediate-range nuclear weapons (SS 20) in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, worsened the climate of East-West relations. NATO reacted to this serious upset of the balance of security by deciding that it, too, would introduce new missiles as from 1983. But at the same time it proposed arms control negotiations to the Soviet Union. This was the 'two-track' decision. In protest at the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway and the Federal Republic refused to take part in the Moscow Summer Olympics (1980). The Americans tried a new initiative, the 'zero' solution, by which the Soviets would remove their intermediate-range missiles whilst NATO would promise not to deploy its Pershing II and the new Cruise missiles. Chancellor Schmidt insisted on the missile modernization alternative so as not to leave any gaps in the Western security shield, but at the same time tried to keep the damage to the German-German relationship within limits. Although East German leader Erich Honekker proposed to introduce a separate East German citizenship, and although the East German regime drastically increased the daily amount of currency which visitors from the West had to exchange on entering the GDR, Schmidt visited East Germany, but without getting any substantial concessions from Honecker. The regime's hardening ideological stance was not least a reaction to the growing protest movements in neighbouring Poland, where the people were demanding economic reform, freedom and disarmament. But the missile question was not only problematical in the East. In Bonn the FDP decided to change its tack on economic policy and began to drift out of the coalition. Grassroots SPD followers, largely because of pressure from the peace movement and some union factions, withdrew their support for Schmidt for adhering to the NATO two-track decision. As a result, Helmut Kohl replaced him as Chancellor at the head of a CDU/CSU/FDP coalition. He continued Bonn's security policy and close cooperation with Paris and Washington with a view to uniting Europe within a stable and secure framework. In the face of massive protest from the peace movement, sections of the SPD and the Greens (who had polled 5.6% of the votes in the 1983 election for the Bundestag and thus were represented in parliament for the first time), the German parliament approved in November 1983 the deployment of intermediate-range missiles because of 'the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority' (Chancellor Kohl).
Whereas the growing peace movement had been one of the causes
of a change in government in West Germany, protest groups in East Germany, which
through the initiative of the Church (swords into ploughshares) had become more
and more vociferous since the beginning of 1982, led ultimately to the disintegration
of the entire socialist system. |
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